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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1951 TERM
ing of the words used in view of the circumstances of their use47
(interpretation). The former determines the quantity and quality
of the estates flowing from the testator's words. Definite rules of
property law are applied, and the testator's intent becomes imma-
terial. The lex loci rei sitae controls in this area. The interpreta-
tive process, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with estab-
lishing the intent of the testator from the words used in the in-
strument. The meaning of such words can best be judged in the
light of the law and usage controlling at the time and place of the
will's execution." Thus it would seem that the law of the testa-
tor's domicile should control in this area.49
In a situation such as existed in the Good case, the natural
presumptions would appear to be: first, that if the testator had
any law in mind at the time of the will's execution, it was the law
of his domicile; and, second, that he intended that all of his prop-
erty was to pass in a uniform manner. However, the Court in the
instant case applied the law of the situs in interpreting the will.
If the results flowing from the above propositions are deemed de-
sirable, the present decision is unfortunate in that it did violence
both to the testator's intent and to a uniform passage of his
property.
IV. CoN CTs
Appellate review frequently brings forth a change or modi-
cation of the existing body of law. The work of the Court of
Appeals in the area of contract law is without exception. Last
term witnessed the first direct holding in New York that parties
may effectively prohibit the assignment of contract rights. The
one-year section of the Statute of Frauds also received consid-
erable attention with somewhat less fortunate results. Still other
'eases tended to clarify or restate existing law.
Preliminary Negotiations
Frequently, parties plan to enter into a formal written agree-
ment and have orally-decided upon all the terms to be incorporated
therein. The question is whether they have bound themselves
prior to the execution of the formal document. In Schwartz v.
47. Id. § 251.2.
48. Staigg v. Atkinson, 144 Mass. 564, 12 N. E. 354 (1887).
49. RESTATMMNT, CoNxFIzcT OF LAWS § 251 (3):
The meaning of words used in a devise of land which, by the law of the state
where the land is . . . is, in the absence of controlling circumstances to the contrary.
determined in accordance with usage at the domicil of the testator at the time the will
was made.
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Greenberg1 the parties and their attorneys met for the purpose
of entering into a written contract for the sale of certain shares
of stock. The plaintiff's attorney produced typewritten duplicates
of the agreement, and plaintiff signed one copy and defendant
signed the other. The defendant tendered a check for the pur-
chase price, but it was refused, plaintiff demanded a certified
check. Thereupon the parties agreed to postpone completion of
the transaction until the next day, and each retained his signed
copy. The following day, the defendant refused to go on. The
Official Referee who tried the action dismissed the complaint on
a finding-that there was no delivery. This finding was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, which ruled that the evidence showed
that the parties did not intend to be bound until-a written agree-
ment had been signed and delivered.
The fact that parties to an oral contract intend that it shall
be reduced to a formal document will not prevent the creation of
a present obligation, notwithstanding the fact that the formal
document was never executed, if the oral contract is itself finally
assented to.2 That the parties contemplated a formal writing does
not per se leave the oral transaction incomplete, in the absence
of a positive agreement that it should not be binding until reduced
to writing 3 The circumstance however, that the parties contem-
plated the preparation of a written contract constitutes "strong
evidence," '4 and perhaps a presumption, 5 that any preliminary
agreement is not a contract.
Whether the oral understanding is binding in itself and the
writing is desired as a memorandum, or the oral agreement is
merely preliminary to entering into the written contract, is a
question of intent.' The test is whether one of the parties has
1. 304 N. Y. 250, 107 N. E. 2d 65 (1952).
2. Pratt v. Hudson R. R. Co., 21 N. Y. 305, 309 (1860); Sanders v. Potllitzer
Bros. Fruit Co., 144 N. Y. 209, 214, 39 N. E. 75, 76 (1894). The following cases
hold that the oral agreement was binding although it was agreed to reduce the contract
to writing: Sherry v. Proal, 206 N. Y. 726, 100 N. E. 421 (1912) ; Saltz,nan v. Barson,
239 N. Y. 332, 146 N. E. 618 (1925). The following cases hold that no binding con-
tract existed until acceptance of the formal writing: Ansorge v. Kane, 244 N. Y. 395,
399, 155 N. E. 683, 685 (1927) ; Kingsbridge Improvement Co. v. Am. Exchange-Pac.
Nat. Bank, 249 N. Y. 97, 162 N. E. 597 (1929).
3. Disken v. Herter, 73 App. Div. 453, 77 N. Y. Supp. 300 (1903), aff'd men., 175
N. Y. 480, 67 N. E. 1081 (1903).
4. Sullivan v. Happy Hour Amusement Co., 177 App. Div. 232, 163 N. Y. Supp.
715 (3rd Dep't 1917) ; Savage v. Weigel, 128 Misc. 618, 219 N. Y. Supp. 99 (Sup. Ct.
1926).
5. Bryant v. Ondrak, 87 Hun. 477, 34 N. Y. Supp. 384 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
'6. Sanders v. Pottlitzer Bros. Fruit Co., supra n. 2.
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manifested the intention not to be bound until the writing shall
have been executed,7 in which case the agreement must be assented
to as written before it becomes binding.8 Signing and delivery
commonly are sufficient proof of assent.' Actual physical delivery
of the instrument is not always necessary, since assent may be
shown in various ways.10  But where the intention is that the
writing shall take effect only upon delivery, no contract exists
until the document is delivered."
The instant case clearly shows that where the intention of the
parties is not to be bound until delivery of the formal document,
the actual signing and retention of that document, coupled with
an objection to the manner of payment of the purchase price, is
not an acceptance or delivery of the writing, even though no ob-
jection was made to the document as written.
Offer and Acceptanwe
It is not uncommon that parties choose to completely ignore
an offer. The difficulty is that silence may be tantamount to ac-
ceptance. In Schultz & Co. v. Camden Fire I. Ass'n.,12 the plain-
tiff alleged that defendant insurer by its agent had orally agreed
over the telephone to transfer a certain policy covering plaintiff's
1922 Mack truck to his 1933 Mack truck. Subsequent to this alleged
agreement to transfer and insure, the 1933 Mack truck was stolen.
Plaintiff now seeks recovery under the theft clause of the policy.
The plaintiff's agent testified that she had mailed a post card with
the motor number of the 1933 M ack to the agent of the defendant,.
after telephoning a person who said she was the secretary of the
defendant's agent.- The telephone conver'ation was excluded as
it was not shown .that it was with a person qualified to bind the
defendant. The Court of Appeals held that when an application
for insurance is made, the silence of the insurer without other
circumstances does not operate as an acceptance. As a matter of
law, the plaintiff failed to prove acceptance.
7. Commercial Telegraph Co. v. Smith, 47 Hun. 494 (N. Y. 1888); 1 Wnxiszox,
CoirrnAcTs § 28A (rev. ed. 1936).
8. 1 CRmI, CoNTIRAcrs §30 (1951).
9. 1 CoRBiN, op. cit. supra n. 8.
10. Sarasohn v. Kamaiky, 193 N. Y. 203, 86 N. E. 20 (1908). Simply reading
over the terms may not be enough; even signing the written contract and retaining pos-
session" of it may not express a sufficient assent. W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Royal, 30 Ga.
App. 706, 199 S. E. 339 (1923).
11. Dietz v. Parish, 79 N. Y. 520, 523 (1880).
12. 304 N. Y. 143, 106 N. E. 2d 273 (1952).
